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Abstract 
In Scotland, the formation of a minority government in 2007 by the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) provided the potential for profound changes in intergovernmental relations.  
This followed eight years of a Scottish Labour-led coalition government characterised by 
a low key and informal relationship with the UK Labour government. From 1999-2007, 
discussions were conducted informally and almost entirely through political parties and 
executives (ministers and civil servants). Although formal mechanisms for negotiation 
and dispute resolution existed - including the courts, concordats and Joint Ministerial 
Committees - they were used rarely. The Scottish Executive also played a minimal role in 
EU policy making. Yet, an ‘explosive’ new era of relations between the Scottish and UK 
governments did not arrive in tandem with the new era of party incongruence. The aim of 
this article is to explore these issues by asking two main questions: why were formal 
mechanisms used so rarely from 1999-2007, and what factors have produced muted 
rather than problematic IGR from 2007-11?
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In Scotland, the formation of a Scottish National Party (SNP) government in 2007 
provided the potential for profound changes in IGR. The first eight years of Scottish 
devolution (1999-2007) were marked by high party congruence. The Labour party 
formed a majority UK government from 1997-2010, while Scottish Labour was the main 
party within a coalition government that spanned two four-year terms. Party congruence 
appeared to influence strongly the nature of IGR by effectively institutionalising an 
informal system of consultation and negotiation through party and ministerial channels 
(supplemented by the UK civil service network).  In 2007, the coalition was replaced by a 
minority government led by a party committed not only to challenging that system of 
IGR, but also the very nature of the constitutional settlement. Then, in 2010, the UK 
Labour government was replaced by a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition – 
suggesting that the initially high levels of party congruence in the first eight years will be 
replaced by at least seven years of low congruence. Yet, the initial change of party in 
2007 did not have a dramatic effect on IGR, while the more general loss of high party 
congruence is unlikely to lead to radically different relationships between the UK and 
Scottish governments.   
 
This article explains why IGR remains notably stable over time by highlighting the 
factors that encourage a particular intergovernmental style in Scotland within the UK.  A 
major aim of this edited volume is to explore an ‘overall logic’ underpinning IGR in the 
UK. To this end, the article draws on the policy communities literature to identify a ‘logic 
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of informality’ between governments that resembles the ‘logic of consultation’ (Jordan 
and Maloney, 1997) between governments and interest groups. The first key argument in 
this literature is that governments do not try to impose policy decisions regularly even if 
they appear to be in a position to do so. It provides a useful corrective to studies which 
label the UK system as ‘majoritarian’ and associate it, in a very misleading way, with a 
concentration of power in the centre and top-down policy making without recourse to 
meaningful consultation (Cairney, 2011: 208). Rather, top-down policy making is 
expensive and, as such, used sparingly – even by governments that are clearly more 
powerful than other actors. The second is that successful ‘pressure participants’ (such as 
interest groups – Jordan et al, 2004) generally pursue an insider strategy towards 
government - presenting fairly reasonable demands, managing their own expectations (or 
recognising that the balance of power is in favour of government), and criticising 
government policy infrequently – to build up their reputation and maximise their 
influence within policy networks. Combined, we find that most policy is made in a 
relatively straightforward way by governments in consultation with groups and beyond 
the public spotlight – a process that receives far less attention than the small number of 
highly visible issues involving government imposition and group opposition (2011: 211).   
 
The same logic applies to IGR in two main ways. First, top-down policy making is often 
politically expensive and generally unnecessary. Consequently, the UK government tends 
not to impose policies on devolved governments. Second, Scottish governments generally 
accept the reality of an asymmetry of power between UK and Scottish governments, and 
recognise the benefits of pursuing the same kinds of insider strategies associated with 
groups (see also Midwinter et al, 1991, for a description of the former Scottish Office as 
one of the UK’s most significant pressure groups). It would be reasonable to expect this 
relationship to weaken during periods of low party congruence. However, the ‘SNP 
effect’ (from 2007-11) has largely been undermined by the constraints of minority 
government and the tendency for opposition parties to reject policies in the Scottish 
Parliament that would have tested current IGR arrangements. It has also been addressed 
by a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in the UK which appears to be 
particularly unwilling to entertain the idea of top-down policy making in Scotland. 
 
The aim of the article is to explore these issues by asking two main questions: why were 
formal mechanisms used so rarely from 1999-2007, and what factors have produced 
muted rather than problematic IGR in this new era of party incongruence?
1
 The common 
factors are a ‘logic of informality’ that suits both sides, but also an asymmetry of power 
between governments that constrains the strategies that are realistically available to 
devolved governments. The article also considers the tendency (from 2007-11) for inter-
party relations to pre-empt intergovernmental relations. It concludes with a brief 
discussion of the initial effects of the formation of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat UK 
government in May 2010. 
 
The New Era of Party Incongruence  
 
The SNP government followed eight years of remarkably informal and uncontroversial 
relations between the UK and Scottish governments. From 1999-2003 and 2003-2007, 
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Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats formed a coalition (the ‘Scottish 
Executive’) which commanded the majority of MSPs in the Scottish Parliament. In each 
parliamentary session the parties produced a ‘partnership agreement’ setting out in detail 
their legislative and policy plans. While the Liberal Democrats may have done 
disproportionately well out of the agreement, Labour was the senior partner in both 
sessions (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 121). This allowed relations to develop between 
the UK and Scottish executives as if there was a shared party in government.   
 
From 1999-2007 the Scotland-UK IGR strategy was clear: discussions were conducted 
informally and almost entirely through executives (ministers and civil servants) rather 
than legislatures or the judiciary. Other mechanisms for negotiation and dispute 
resolution existed but were used rarely. The role of the courts was minimal. There were 
no references of Scottish bills to judicial review; the Scottish Executive was more likely 
to ‘remove offending sections’ than face delay (Page, 2005). The role of Holyrood-
Westminster relations was limited, and the Scottish Parliament was restricted to the 
passing of ‘Sewel’ motions – ‘legislative consent’ motions passed by the Scottish 
Parliament giving consent for the Westminster Parliament (and in effect the UK 
government) to pass legislation on devolved policy areas (Cairney, 2006; Cairney and 
Keating, 2004). There was a clear bias towards informality between executives. Although 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was produced to guide the conduct of 
executives, and individual concordats to encourage cooperation between departments, the 
day-to-day business was conducted through civil servants with minimal reference to 
them. As Horgan (2004: 122) suggests, there was an ‘informal flavour’ to formal 
concordats since - as in Canada and Australia - they are not legally binding. Rather, while 
they took some time to produce and were initially taken very seriously by Whitehall 
departments, they represent a, ‘statement of political intent … binding in honour only’ 
(Cm 5240, 2001: 5). The MoU’s main function is to promote good communication 
between executives, particularly when one knows that forthcoming policies will affect the 
other. This emphasis is furthered in the individual concordats which devote most of their 
discussions to reiterating the need for communication, confidentiality and forward notice 
(the ‘no surprises’ approach that allowed the UK government, to a large extent, to see 
what was coming). For some of the civil servants that produced them, they represented 
‘common sense’ with little need to refer to them (Sir Muir Russell, former Permanent 
Secretary, Scottish Office and Scottish Executive, in Commission on Scottish 
Devolution, 2008a: 2; see also Jack McConnell, former First Minister, Commission on 
Scottish Devolution, 2008b: 13).   
 
Although the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) was designed to allow the UK 
government to call a meeting with the devolved governments to coordinate working 
arrangements, discuss the impact of devolved policy on reserved areas and vice versa, 
share experience and consider disputes, it met infrequently (Trench, 2004).
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 The JMC is a 
consultative rather than an executive body, with issues to be referred to it on the rare 
occasions that discussions between executives break down. Such was the bias against 
taking issues to the JMC that its members found little to discuss (Jack McConnell, 
Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2008b: 12; Jim Wallace, former Deputy First 
Minister, Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2008c: 9). Instead, bilateral working 
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relationships between government departments became the norm, while matters of 
concern were discussed through political parties (and Scottish and UK Labour ministers 
in particular). The existence of coalition in government in Scotland complicated matters 
to some extent, and the most high profile instance in which an issue ‘broke free’ from the 
quiet world of IGR related to a policy (free personal care for older people) linked closely 
to Liberal Democrat aims (there were also tensions on PR in local elections). Yet, there 
was no systematic pattern of disputes and little demand for high profile resolution. The 
formal system of IGR was arguably prepared as an afterthought and treated as such 
(Mitchell, 2010). 
 
In 2007, the SNP formed a minority administration and changed its name to the 
symbolically significant ‘Scottish government’. It had already stated that it would not 
continue with the existing arrangements. Instead, it would: push for an independent civil 
service; discourage Sewel motions; call for a reinstatement of regular JMC plenary 
meetings; challenge UK policies (such as nuclear power); and publicly ‘stick up for 
Scotland’s interests’ rather than (in Alex Salmond’s words) be careful not to be seen 
arguing with its ‘big brother’ (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 162). The new relationship 
appeared to begin almost immediately when then Prime Minister Tony Blair did not 
congratulate Salmond on his election as First Minister, and Salmond criticised Blair 
publicly for not consulting the Scottish government on plans to create a prisoner transfer 
agreement with Libya (that would eventually contribute to pressure on the Scottish 
government to release the ‘Lockerbie bomber’ – see Cairney, 2009b).3   
 
Developments in UK politics also spilled over into the relationship. The ascension of a 
Scot, Gordon Brown, to Prime Minister prompted an increase in UK media and 
(particularly Conservative) party attention to Scotland’s disproportionate share of UK 
public expenditure (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 165), the number of Scotland MPs and 
the ‘West Lothian’ question (see Cairney, 2009a: 23) – perhaps producing the need for 
Gordon Brown to take a robust UK line on Scottish demands. Combined, the new UK 
and Scottish contexts provided the potential to reinforce a shift in IGR caused by party 
incongruence in 2007.   
 
Yet, the new era of IGR did not materialise.
4
 The 2007-11 period has been marked by a 
striking level of continuity in UK-Scottish relations, largely because there is a strong 
logic underpinning IGR in the UK.    
 
The Logic of Informality 
 
The logic of informal IGR has direct parallels to the ‘logic of consultation’ between 
interest groups and governments. As Jordan and Maloney (1997) argue, close and policy 
community-like relationships between groups and government are pervasive as a 
‘consequence of policy making requirements’. Governments and groups trade access and 
influence for information and advice; this ‘logic of policy making … acts as a drive 
towards … stable, regulated predictable relations’. The logic of ‘bureaucratic 
accommodation’ refers to the benefits of reaching a consensus (or at least practical 
understanding) with interest groups rather than imposing decisions. Although the UK is 
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characterised as a ‘majoritarian’ system associated with ‘top-down’ policy making 
(Lijphart, 1999), it does not operate as such. Instead, the UK government shares a 
common policy style with governments in ‘consensus democracies’, based on the need of 
civil servants to gather information from interest groups and legitimise decisions through 
consultation (Richardson, 1982; Cairney, 2011b). This need is strong since it encourages 
group ownership of policy and maximises governmental knowledge of possible 
problems. Further, the size of the state and scope for ‘overload’ necessitates breaking 
policy down into more manageable sectors and sub-sectors that are less subject to top-
down control (see Cairney, 2008a). Even during periods of political conflict, this logic 
‘tends to reassert itself and policy community-type features can emerge in the context of 
the conflict’; on many occasions the resolution of high profile controversies requires 
disaggregation into a series of ‘less contentious manageable facets that are processable 
within policy community arrangements’ (Jordan and Maloney, 1997: 570).   
 
The broader lesson is that few governments are willing or able to bear the cost of 
continuous top-down policy making, even if their political structures appear to give them 
a particular advantage in this regard. Therefore, a consistently top-down approach to IGR 
is no more likely than a top-down approach to consultation. Instead, we would also 
expect executives to find ways to cooperate for mutual gain. This logic can be linked to 
what McGarvey and Cairney (2008: 167) call ‘positive’ reasons for informal IGR, 
bearing in mind that they may be more positive for the executives involved rather than 
those they represent and are accountable to (Cairney, 2009a: 5-7). The classic example is 
the Barnett formula used to determine changes to devolved public expenditure. There is 
considerable debate in the literature about the origins of the formula, what it was 
designed to do and what its effect has been (described in Cairney, 2009a: 5-6 and 23, note 
5). For our purposes, the most relevant reason to maintain Barnett is that it suited both 
parties. For Scottish administrations, it was one way to minimise a reduction in 
Scotland’s share of UK public expenditure, while for the Treasury it was a way to avoid 
spending a disproportionate amount of time on protracted annual budget negotiations for 
sums that are small when compared to its overall commitments.   
 
A key tenet of the policy communities literature is that policy issues are portrayed as dull 
affairs to limit public interest and participation. If an issue can be successfully presented 
as a ‘technical’ issue for experts (related to a problem which has largely been solved), 
power can be exercised behind the scenes by a small number of participants 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Jordan and Maloney, 1997). In this sense, the Barnett 
formula represents a successful attempt by decision makers in Scotland and the UK to 
keep the big and potentially most contentious questions of funding off the political 
agenda. Barnett ‘solved’ the problem of devolved finance; the annual budget rounds 
became almost automatic, with scope for negotiation only on the ‘technical’ issue of 
Barnett consequentials (the sums received by devolved governments when levels of 
spending in England change).  Further, their relationship was helped considerably during 
the 1999-2007 period by significant rises in UK and Scottish public expenditure. The 
types of disagreements on the adequacy of the funding settlement that we are now 
witnessing between the UK, Scottish and other devolved governments are unusual; 
fundamental issues of territorial finance have tended to arise sporadically, for example, 
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when linked to other events such as the election of a nationalist party just before the rise 
of a Scottish Prime Minister or an economic crisis.   
 
A second example is the extensive use of Sewel motions (76 were passed from 1999-
2007). The Sewel motion became a convenient tool to minimise the need to coordinate 
separate legislation when the boundaries between reserved and devolved responsibilities 
were unclear and/ or when a UK-wide approach was necessary to maintain consistency of 
standards. Instead, the UK government legislated on Scotland’s behalf and often 
devolved the day-to-day responsibility for policy to Scottish ministers (‘executive 
devolution’). In many cases, the issues were innocuous and commanded cross-party 
support. Yet, there were also instances of political cowardice when Scottish Executive 
ministers seemed keen to remove issues from the Scottish agenda, reinforcing opposition 
party claims that the Scottish Parliament was marginalised from issues of IGR and that 
formal contact on Westminster legislation affecting Scotland should involve a 
relationship between legislatures as well as executives (Winetrobe, 2005; Page and 
Batey, 2002).  
 
The overall lack of formality in IGR was also criticised by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution (2002): since most contact between ministers and parties 
was by email, telephone or ‘quick words when people meet socially’ it was not recorded 
in the same way as formal minuted meetings. The report suggests that such informality 
depends on the ‘fundamental goodwill of each administration toward the others’. 
However, if the importance of formal contacts, for example through the JMC, was not 
made clear from the start, this may store up problems when Scotland and the UK do not 
share the same party of government (or at least when those in key posts no longer know 
each other – see also Jack McConnell, Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2008b: 14).  
 
Yet, such fears proved to be largely unproven. The informal relationships between 
executives did not disappear as soon as the SNP formed a government and new faces 
appeared at the negotiating table. Instead, new and informal working relationships 
developed rather quickly. Although there have been more instances of high profile 
disagreements since 2007 (see Cairney, 2009a: 21-3), there is a still tendency for this 
charged atmosphere to give way to a more humdrum, day-to-day relationship as different 
actors (usually civil servants) work through the details. In other words, the SNP 
government appeared to accept its relationship with the UK government in much the 
same way as its predecessor. These informal links developed partly because the new 
Scottish government frequently had as much to gain as the old Scottish executive.    
 
In this regard, we can again draw parallels with group-government relations and the 
decision by interest groups to engage in insider or outsider strategies (Grant, 1995; 
Maloney et al, 1994).  If we treat the SNP as a radical interest group, we may ask: what 
does it have to gain from its relationship with the UK government?  We may wonder if its 
leadership behaviour revolves, ‘around one central point: how many recruits will this 
bring into the organization?’ (Alinsky, 1971: 113; Grant Jordan, in correspondence).  
Ministers may be driven by the pay-offs (attention and popularity) associated with 
standing up for Scotland’s interests; engaging in, and publicising, disputes even if there is 
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no hope of winning them. Indeed, this motivation may be stronger for political parties 
than interest groups. Yet, as Mitchell (2008) argues, it is difficult to treat the SNP as 
radical. Instead, the ‘fundamentalists’ have been replaced by ‘pragmatists’ in the SNP 
hierarchy which is ‘more in search of respectability than revolution’ (2008: 248) and 
which has found it more effective to recruit members through the ‘presidentialization’ of 
its leader and professionalisation of the party’s operations (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 
63). In other words, dignified pragmatism in government may be a better fit with the new 
image of the SNP leadership than the pursuit of conflict for electoral gain.   
 
The SNP has largely been willing to adopt an insider strategy which includes an 
acceptance of the ‘rules of the game’, or a willingness to engage in self-regulating 
activities (the value of which some of the party rank-and-file may not appreciate) in the 
short term, to allow it to benefit in the long-term. The best example may be the SNP’s 
attitude to negotiations with the UK over EU policy formulation. There has been a 
stronger rhetoric on Scotland’s independent role on the world stage (marking a shift, to 
some extent, from para- to proto-diplomacy - Keating, 2010: 162) and the desire of the 
Scottish government to enjoy a higher status than before in relation to the UK, perhaps 
even taking the lead in UK/ EU negotiations in areas such as fishing (Cairney, 2011c).  
Yet, SNP ministers have also operated within UK structures, agreeing to uphold a 
principle that they criticised in opposition: ‘the devolved administrations are involved in 
the formulation of the United Kingdom line but on the basis that they may not disclose to 
anyone – including their own legislature or assembly – what disagreements they have had 
with the UK government over the formulation of that line’ (Johnston, 2007; see also 
Cairney, 2009a).  Overall, the SNP approach has been ‘pragmatic’, consisting of a greater 
propensity to make direct submissions to EU institutions (e.g. regarding the North Sea 
‘supergrid’) but ‘not to disrupt the UK position’ and based on an understanding of the 
‘reality of the pecking order where member states have the weight’ and devolved 
governments make a relatively small contribution to EU policy making (interview, 
Scottish government Special Advisor, July 2009; see also Keating, 2010).     
 
We can also see more pragmatism than posturing on domestic matters. The SNP has 
pursued strongly the formalisation of IGR through the JMC machinery and has also 
sought the cooperation of its counterparts in Wales and Northern Ireland to boost the 
status of devolved governments in relation to the UK government. However, it has rarely 
pursued this agenda through anything other than diplomatic means. Overall, the SNP 
government has ‘surprised many by not being overtly confrontational’ and by 
encouraging its civil service to be, ‘open, cooperative and helpful to their counterparts in 
the UK government, rather than to maximise points of friction’ (Trench, 2007: 46; 
Trench, 2008b: 56). While there have been publicised short-term disagreements, these 
often give way to longer term negotiations behind the scenes.  For example, the issue of 
Barnett consequentials for the London Olympics has parallels in Jordan and Maloney’s 
(1997) discussion of Brent Spar (which began as a Greenpeace protest and public 
denunciation of BP, followed by a lower profile negotiated settlement using the 
government machinery). What began as a public dispute soon changed into an issue 
processed behind the scenes (although it has recently been referred to the JMC – see 
below). Similarly, the SNP’s criticism in opposition of Scottish Executive attempts to 
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pilot an airgun licensing scheme in Scotland, as part of an overall UK strategy, was 
followed by its pursuit of the same idea when in government (Cairney, 2008b; McGarvey 
and Cairney, 2008: 163). These examples supplement the more ad hoc links between 
executives during crises (such as the terrorist attack on Glasgow airport, the fuel crisis 
caused by strikes at the BP Grangemouth oil refinery, the foot-and-mouth outbreak and 
the spread of swine flu – Trench, 2007; Mitchell, 2010). Overall, ‘a surprising amount of 
the old informality and co-operation has re-emerged as ministers at both levels realise 
that they have problems in common and need each other’ (Keating, 2010: 146). 
 
The SNP government’s promotion of Sewel motions also suggests that the expediency 
and convenience of the process extends beyond governments with the same party 
(Mitchell, 2010; Crawford, 2007; Crawford, 2010). It approved slightly fewer motions 
(averaging 8.5 per year compared to 9.5 from 1999-2007, compared to an average of 10.5 
and 12.9 Scottish Parliament Acts respectively) and has sought, when possible, to 
promote Scottish parliamentary measures instead. However, we have not witnessed the 
type of sea change we might have expected from a party which, in opposition, presented 
principled stances against the process (for a taste of the parliamentary debate on this 
issue, see Cairney, 2009a: 12). 
 
One issue that seems to contradict the idea of party continuity is the diminished ability of 
the civil services to maintain close links since 2007 (see also Richard Parry’s article in 
this volume). Yet, the links between civil servants in the early years of devolution have 
been exaggerated and they have weakened naturally over time as the UK and devolved 
governments deal increasingly with different issues. The need for mobility between 
Edinburgh and London was ‘a decisive argument in the decision to keep a unified civil 
service’ (Keating and Cairney, 2006: 53), but 70% of senior civil servants in Scotland 
have not enjoyed a spell working in a Whitehall department (2006: 55).  Further, the idea 
of a Whitehall club in which civil servants in Scotland were consistently invited to policy 
meetings (Parry and Jones, 2000: 63), and developed personal networks, has been 
undermined over time by significant Whitehall ignorance of political differences in 
Scotland and a decreasing willingness among civil servants to trade-off time spent in the 
UK for time lost developing policy in Scotland (secondments to the Scottish public or 
private sectors may also be as likely to advance their careers as a spell in Whitehall). This 
is particularly the case in departments such as health and education where policy has 
diverged and policy makers at the UK and Scottish levels face different problems. 
Evidence from the Scottish government’s former Permanent Secretary, John Elvidge, 
suggests that the informal contacts between civil servants in Scotland and England had 
already diminished before the SNP took office. The SNP’s handling of a high profile 
disagreement on foot-and-mouth compensation in 2007 was said to have undermined the 
UK government’s willingness to engage informally through the civil service network – 
but this would be, ‘breaking quite a slender thread’ (Elvidge, in McGarvey and Cairney, 
2008: 131). In other words, the SNP era merely accelerated a natural reduction, but not 
abolition, of the formal and informal circulation of papers and ideas across the UK civil 
service network (Keating, 2010; although see Parry’s article in this volume which notes 
the significance of the appointment of Sir Peter Housden as Permanent Secretary in June 
2010. Housden was a Permanent Secretary in the UK government’s Department for 
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Communities and Local government, with no previous experience in the Scottish 
government). 
 
Overall, the 2007-10 period (i.e. before the UK General Election in 2010) displays a 
notable degree of continuity. UK and Scottish ministers developed fairly cordial 
relationships and the SNP has operated rather quietly within a UK intergovernmental 
framework: contributing to a UK line on EU affairs; pursuing a reasonable degree of 
formality in IGR; negotiating policy issues behind closed doors; passing Sewel motions 
and generally working within an already-changing civil service framework. The logic of 
informality is strong and governments from most parties have much to gain from these 
arrangements.   
  
The Asymmetry of Power 
 
The UK is asymmetrical in two senses - first because devolution was extended to a small 
share of the population, with Scotland (8.6%), Wales (4.9%) and Northern Ireland (2.9%) 
accounting for 16.4%; and, second, because the balance of power is tipped towards UK 
policy departments dealing predominantly with the English population and, in particular, 
the Treasury which is both a player and the referee in negotiations with devolved 
governments. As Keating (2005: 120) suggests, the UK ‘centre’ is faced with small 
devolved governments which do not match the powers of federated or devolved 
authorities in countries such as Germany, Spain, Belgium or Canada. Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland are not part of a collection of powerful regions and the UK does not 
have a ‘supreme constitution’ guaranteeing a level of autonomy for devolved 
governments (Watts, 2007). This imbalance of power was summed up by the early role of 
the Secretary of State for Scotland as the UK government’s representative in Scotland.  
Under its first Scottish Secretary, John Reid, the Scotland Office was prepared to 
intervene in Scottish politics in a way viewed by the Scottish Executive as interference 
(Leicester, 2000: 27; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 159), while under its second, Helen 
Liddell, there was still a perception that it was a legitimate Scottish Secretary role to 
manage, if not the policy process, then at least the internal affairs of the Scottish Cabinet 
(Mitchell et al, 2001: 56).   
 
While the visibility of the Scottish Secretary receded from 2002, this was at the 
prerogative of the UK government.  Indeed, it reinstated the full-time role in 2007, in part 
reflecting the need for more mediation between different parties but also the desire for 
Labour to regain political ground in Scotland. Although Jim Murphy was initially at pains 
to stress his role as ‘Scotland's man in the cabinet rather than the cabinet's man in 
Scotland’ (Trench, January 2009a: 71), it is difficult to ignore the party political 
overtones of statements about the ‘arc of insolvency’ (in relation to Alex Salmond’s 
previous discussion of certain independent countries as the ‘arc of prosperity’) and the 
apparent strategy of refusing First and Prime Ministerial meetings to ‘equate Salmond on 
a par with Murphy and therefore less important than Brown’ (Cairney, 2011c). Murphy’s 
involvement also produced, from the perspective of some members of the Scottish 
government, a ‘less smooth, less direct’ relationship, or a ‘wedge’ between previously 
direct Scottish and UK government departmental relationships as more issues are 
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funnelled through a third party (interview, Scottish government Special Advisor, July 
2009). Certainly, relations seemed smoother when the Scottish government previously 
dealt with David Cairns (Minister of State) when the Scottish Secretary was still a part-
time role (Mitchell, 2010) (this narrative is disputed by the Scotland Office, interview, 
July 2009).
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The asymmetry of power has three main effects. First, the devolved governments do not 
have a mechanism with which to oblige the UK government to consult and there has been 
a tendency for UK ministers to disengage from the formal IGR process. The lack of JMC 
meetings during a Labour-led government was: ‘a clear indicator that devolution is no 
longer a prime concern of the Prime Minister and other politicians’ (Trench, 2004: 515–
6). The UK government was also slow to agree to the SNP’s call for the reinstatement of 
regular JMC meetings - the JMC plenary met only twice from 2007-10, while the JMC 
(Domestic) met once (Trench, 2008a; 2009a).   
 
Second, civil servants in Whitehall often forget about Scotland and neglect to consult, 
then make statements on UK policy without a Scottish qualification or opt-out – a 
problem which grew over time as devolution faded from view in London (Keating, 2005: 
125; Keating, 2010; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 167; Cairney 2011c). In other words, 
devolved governments may generally pursue an insider strategy but are often treated 
effectively as outsiders. These issues were discussed briefly in the public domain 
following a leaked report from the Scottish Executive’s EU office (Aron, 2006; SNP, 
2006). The main finding was that the best way for the Scottish Executive to influence 
Europe was through Whitehall (particularly since the UK government discouraged the 
Scottish Executive’s direct EU involvement - Cairney, 2011c), but its success depended 
on a disproportionate amount of coordinated work by Scottish officials. According to the 
report, in some cases, Whitehall departments had deliberately excluded their Scottish 
counterparts from the process, while in most cases the problem was that the Executive 
was not consulted at a stage early enough to influence the direction of policy. The overall 
success of IGR has also varied strongly by policy area (and, in some cases, personalities) 
with, for example, a long tradition of cooperation in agriculture contrasting with areas 
such as economic development in which intra-governmental contact between the Scottish 
Office and the relevant Whitehall department was minimal (interview, Scotland Office 
official, 2009; perhaps the nature of the devolved settlement, to particular policy 
domains, also affects overall IGR). 
 
Third, Scottish actors are reluctant to challenge the authority of the UK government. For 
example, Page and Batey (2002: 513; Page, 2002) suggest that the UK government drove 
the agenda for policy coordination. Most Sewel motions came from UK departments after 
the legislative slot had been secured, with Scottish ministers ‘effectively forced to agree 
to Westminster legislation in the devolved areas’ given the uncertainty over devolved 
government powers and the prospect of the UK government referring the issue to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.  Further, in high profile issues of disputes – such as 
free personal care for older people and Hepatitis C compensation - the Scottish Executive 
was reluctant to ‘rock the boat’ and instead accepted UK ‘victories’ to maintain its good 
relationship with Whitehall (Trench, 2004; although a focus on a very small number of 
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disputes exaggerates their overall importance). The SNP is also, in more cases than we 
might expect or witness, stoical about its status as one of many UK government 
departments (interview, Scottish government Special Advisor, July 2009). In particular, it 
recognises the limits to its negotiating power with a Treasury department that exerts 
considerable power across the UK government as a whole. The SNP finds itself in a 
difficult position. One of its main aims has been to present an image of governing 
competence (to further its agenda on independence), in part by demonstrating that it can 
use its existing powers effectively.  This is not consistent with a strategy of continuously 
venting its frustration with the power of the UK government.   
 
Overall, the asymmetry of power reinforces the logic of informality by providing clear 
incentives for action. Any Scottish government has much to gain from relatively quiet 
negotiations behind the scenes. In contrast, the substantive payoffs from challenging the 
UK position are unclear. The Scottish government does not have any formal powers or a 
written constitution on which to draw and is unlikely to win high profile disputes with the 
UK government. While, in some cases, it might achieve electoral gain by ‘standing up for 
Scotland’, in others it may face being ignored by the UK government (and media) or be 
forced to engage in rather embarrassing debates with the Scottish Secretary, not Prime 
Minister, that expose its relatively weak position.     
 
Inter-Party Relations 
 
The third aspect of informal IGR resulted from minority government: many potential 
intergovernmental issues were played out within Scotland without necessarily reaching a 
decision-making point at the UK level. For example, the SNP government may have 
relished a debate with the UK government over its plans for a local income tax to replace 
the council tax. It would have produced the loss of a UK (council tax) benefit that the 
Scottish Parliament does not have the power to change; Treasury rules dictate that the 
Scottish government has no claim on any money that might be saved from (reserved) UK 
expenditure as a consequence of devolved policy decisions, and the UK government did 
not appear willing to negotiate on this or previous occasions. However, the SNP did not 
have enough opposition party support in the Scottish Parliament to pass the legislation. 
Parliamentary opposition, along with the uncertainty over funding (particularly since the 
Scottish government was preparing for an overall reduction of its budget), was cited by 
Finance Secretary John Swinney as the reason to withdraw the policy (Scott, 2009: 75).  
Similarly, although the Scottish government was highly critical of its budget settlement in 
2007, much of this debate was played out in the Scottish Parliament as Scottish ministers 
attempted to deflect opposition criticism and justify the incomplete delivery of manifesto 
commitments.   
 
Perhaps most importantly, IGR has been rather muted because the fundamental bone of 
contention between the SNP and UK governments – constitutional change – has not come 
to a head. Instead, the SNP initiated a ‘national conversation’ with the Scottish 
population, in part as a means to keep the issue on the public agenda but also put off a 
decision until the SNP’s preferred 2010 referendum. Again, most debates about the 
referendum process itself were played out in the Scottish Parliament, with the SNP 
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needing the support of at least two other parties to pass a referendum bill. This did not 
happen. Indeed, the opposition parties appeared eager to reject the bill before the UK 
general election in 2010, prompting the SNP to publish a draft bill for public consultation 
rather than parliamentary consideration (Gunn, 2010). The bill itself was not introduced 
to Parliament during the 2007-11 session. 
 
The lack of Scottish government ability to innovate with legislation has the potential to 
cause an imbalance of conflict towards instances in which the Scottish government can 
obstruct UK policies. The main example has been nuclear power. While the issue of 
energy is a reserved matter, the Scottish government has final responsibility for planning 
decisions (devolved to ministers since the UK Electricity Act 1989) and has signalled a 
willingness to refuse planning permission for any new nuclear power plant. Yet, the 
boundaries between devolved and reserved in this area have always been unclear and the 
Scottish government’s power has never been fully established. The line by previous 
Scottish Executive ministers was that it could make decisions on nuclear power under the 
executive devolution granted by the UK government (Cairney, 2006: 441) and that 
planning powers to secure energy supplies were reserved (Summers, 2002). More 
importantly, a Scottish-UK dispute has rarely seemed likely. Tony Blair assured Alex 
Salmond in 2002 that the final decision rested with the Scottish Parliament (Summers, 
2002), while an acceptance of the Scottish veto was also contained in its energy White 
Paper in 2008 (Trench, 2008b; even though UK ministers criticised the SNP stance).  
 
Overall, the dynamic of inter-party relations (under minority SNP government) 
reinforced the logic of informality by closing off many avenues for public 
intergovernmental disputes on high profile issues. While the SNP government may have 
preferred to supplement its generally valuable informal relationships with a select number 
of high-profile disputes of its own making (or to publicise a key policy dispute to 
encourage support for constitutional change), it has been blocked by the Unionist parties 
within the Scottish Parliament. The UK government has also avoided pushing other 
potentially divisive issues towards the need for intergovernmental resolution. 
 
The Future of IGR: Business as Usual? 
 
The election of a majority SNP government in 2011 suggests that a referendum on 
independence will take place in two or three years (note that this article was written 
before the election).  Until then, the most likely constitutional change will come from the 
recommendations of the Commission on Scottish Devolution - set up following a motion 
in the Scottish Parliament passed by the main opposition parties, financed and serviced 
by the UK government, and led by Professor Kenneth Calman
6
 (the proposals were 
followed by a Labour government White Paper Cm 7738, 2009, then taken forward by 
the coalition government through the Scotland Bill 2011; see also Trench, 2010a). These 
include plans to: reduce UK income tax by 10 pence in the pound to oblige the Scottish 
Parliament to make a decision on how much income tax should be raised; devolve some 
minor taxes; devolve responsibility for a small number of policy issues (such as air 
weapons, drink drive limits and prescribing medicines to treat drug addiction); reserve 
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more responsibility for a small number of policy issues (such as insolvency and the 
regulation of health professions), and, formalise and extend the process of IGR.     
 
The Calman commission report suggested that the changes in responsibilities should go 
hand in hand with new IGR arrangements, suggesting three main changes. First, the Joint 
Ministerial Committee (supplemented by a JMC Domestic) should become a body to 
foster close working and cooperation relationships rather than just dispute resolution 
(perhaps like the JMC Europe, which meets regularly to discuss EU policy). Further, 
since the UK government will devolve more tax powers, it recommended establishing a 
JMC on Finance to discuss macro-economic policy as well as taxation. Second, there 
should be more training for UK civil servants to improve their knowledge of devolution, 
and the civil service code should be amended to ensure cooperation and mutual respect.  
Third, the Sewel process must be used better to foster meaningful links between 
Parliaments and there should be a Westminster equivalent to the Sewel motion. Yet, it is 
unclear how much demand there is within government for such reforms (IGR 
arrangements are not a feature of the new legislation, although note the unusual 
involvement of a Scottish Parliament committee in the assessment of the Scotland Bill, a 
bill of the Westminster parliament). Further, even if formal intergovernmental 
mechanisms become more of a regular feature, we may still find that policy makers are 
reluctant to engage and, instead, find other arenas in which to resolve issues. This is 
certainly a feature of group-government relations, where formal consultations are 
supplemented by pre-consultation (from informal discussions to the establishment of 
working groups to set the terms of reference for consultation).   
 
A more likely source for IGR change was the formation of a Conservative-led coalition 
government in the UK. The policy communities literature has long demonstrated that the 
need to appear legitimate in the eyes of those they govern is a strong driver for unelected 
decision makers to consult widely - hence part of the reason that civil servants consult so 
much with pressure participants (Richardson and Jordan, 1979). This is an issue that the 
Conservative party effectively faces in Scotland because in 2010 it returned only one MP.  
The result was qualified to some extent by the Conservative coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats, a party with a respectable number of Scotland MPs (11, compared to 
Labour’s 41 and the SNP’s 6) and providing the likely recruitment ground for all Scottish 
Secretaries (beginning with Danny Alexander and then Michael Moore). The 
Conservative position was also helped by the status of the Scottish Conservatives in the 
Scottish Parliament – not only as the holder of 17 seats (13%) from 2007-11, but also as a 
party with often similar views to the SNP and the key player in the SNP’s successful 
attempt to maintain a minority government for a full four-year session (the Conservatives 
and SNP voted together on parliamentary motions 72% of the time – MacGregor, 2010).   
Yet, there was still a sense, at least until the prospect of a referendum diminished, that the 
SNP government could use any dispute with the UK government as a way to remind 
Scottish voters of the legacy of Thatcherism (associated, particularly in Scotland, with a 
top-down, impositional style of policy making) and therefore increase support for 
independence. Such concerns perhaps contributed to the promotion by the UK 
government of the rather vague idea, signalled by David Cameron (2009) during the 
general election campaign, that it would govern the Scots with ‘respect’.     
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The Conservative’s most significant response was not the institutionalisation of formal 
IGR, but there have been some notable developments. The UK and devolved 
governments had already produced a revised Memorandum of Understanding before the 
2010 election (Cabinet Office, 2010; Cm 7864, 2010) and it largely represented a logical 
progression from the MoU that was produced in 2001 and rarely referred to by executives 
(Trench, 2010b). However, the new arrangements (specifically the new ‘Protocol For 
Avoidance And Resolution Of Disputes’) were then used to allow the devolved 
governments to refer an issue of dispute (the refusal of the Treasury, during the term of 
the previous Labour government, to pay Barnett consequentials on spending for the 
London Olympics) to the JMC (Trench; 2010c). The JMC plenary also met very quickly 
(less than a month) after the 2010 election, was chaired by David Cameron, agreed a 
‘role’ for Scottish ministers in European council negotiations, and produced a schedule of 
further meetings (Scottish government, 2010a).   
 
However, we can still identify both aspects of IGR: a limited (albeit now more regular) 
role for formal meetings; and, an asymmetry of power combined with a lack of UK 
attention to devolution (and some ambiguous rules on IGR) with the potential to produce 
Scottish government frustration on issues. The most relevant example is the UK 
government’s Comprehensive Spending Review. While the JMC meetings establish the 
need for the UK to consult with the devolved governments on its spending plans, the 
MoU (Cm 7864, 2010: para 6) states that ‘as a matter of pre-existing practice’, ‘advance 
notification’ on UK budget proposals do not take place or are very limited. Such 
confusion prompted the SNP to complain that it was not consulted adequately on 
measures to reduce public spending – including the UK government’s bonfire of the 
quangos (Edwards, 2010; see also the concern by Trench, 2011 that the Scottish 
Secretary does not fully respect the Sewel convention) – and the devolved governments 
have issued two joint statements expressing concern about UK government strategy 
(Scottish government, 2011). 
 
Yet, the Conservative approach has also been met by a generally non-confrontational 
strategy by the SNP. Most notably, it was highly critical of the Calman Report (and its 
financial provisions in particular), but sought to amend rather than reject the Sewel 
motion on the Scotland Bill 2011, then voted in support of the original motion once its 
amendment was defeated. It also passed four Sewel motions to allow the new coalition 
government to legislate on devolved matters. There have been some disagreements, 
regarding the Scottish government’s access to the fossil fuel levy and the UK 
government’s removal of devolved government access to ‘end year flexibility’ accounts 
(plus a spat over the non-issue of the Scottish variable tax rate – Scottish government, 
2010b), but not enough to suggest that IGR has changed fundamentally since 2010.   
 
The election of a majority SNP government in 2011 will certainly have some effect.  For 
example, two of its key policy plans will require some discussion with the UK: the SNP 
may request the power to tax alcohol to introduce a minimum price; and, a reform of 
council tax will require a discussion on council tax benefits.  Most importantly, the 
prospect of a referendum on independence will at least require some discussion about 
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how the question should be worded and how the governments should interpret the results.  
The SNP also has a new incentive to publicise any problems with its relationship with the 
UK Government.  In other words, ‘a UK Conservative government in office during a 
period of economic retrenchment probably provides the best chance for the SNP 
Government to demonstrate that it would be better making all of its own decisions, and it 
would be a surprise if it did not exploit that opportunity’ (Cairney, 2011d: 7).  Much will 
depend on the attitude of the UK Government which has, so far, recognised the SNP 
Government’s mandate and sought to engage constructively on key issues such as control 
over corporation tax, renewable energy funding and the Crown Estate (Maddox, 24.5.11).   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The UK intergovernmental style is informal – a feature that endures, to some extent, 
despite varying levels of party congruence. Informal IGR was a particular feature when 
the Scottish and UK governments effectively shared a party of government. Formal 
mechanisms to discuss and resolve intergovernmental issues were rare. Instead, the 
executives worked through their civil services and shared Labour party and ministerial 
contacts, and relied on measures, such as the Barnett formula and Sewel motions, to 
make the process of IGR semi-automatic.   
 
The formation of an SNP government had some effect on this intergovernmental 
relationship. There have been more public disputes, the Scottish government has pursued 
measures to formalise IGR, and the reduction in relatively close personal relationships 
may have necessitated a higher degree of formality between ministers. The SNP has also 
been slightly less receptive to the Sewel process and has been content to consider funding 
alternatives to Barnett when in government. Yet, the overall effect has largely been 
piecemeal, with high profile SNP calls for the reinstatement of JMC meetings having, at 
best, an uncertain effect. Whitehall departments have also shown a continuing ability to 
forget to consult the Scottish government (Trench, 2008b: 56). Informal and ad hoc 
relationships between ministers and civil servants in each executive are still the norm.   
 
These relationships endure for two main reasons: the logic of informality or mutual gain, 
in which the UK government has minimal incentive to consistently impose policy from 
the top and the Scottish government often has as much to gain from pursuing an insider 
strategy; and, the asymmetry of power which often allows the UK government to neglect 
the relationship and dissuades Scottish executives from pursuing issues in public. In the 
first phase of the new SNP era (2007-11), this UK intergovernmental logic was 
reinforced by the effect of inter-party relations, in which most policy issues which could 
have caused intergovernmental conflict were instead processed or blocked by parties in 
the Scottish Parliament. The post-2010 period displays, so far, an extended period of 
stability and continuity despite further complications to levels of party congruence. The 
‘logic of informality’ appears to be as significant as the ‘logic of consultation’. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1
 It draws primarily on the policy literature and documentary analysis, supplemented by interviews 
conducted as part of a wider research project on territorial policy communities (for more details see 
Keating et al, 2009).   
2
 The JMC ‘plenary’ did not meet from 2003-7.  The JMC (Europe) met much more frequently.  
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3
 Although Salmond had less criticism for Brown, the pair did not meet regularly.  See H. MacDonell 
6.2.08 ‘Crisis – but First Minister and Brown haven't met for a year’ The Scotsman 
http://news.scotsman.com/scotland/Crisis--but-First-Minister.4954040.jp  
4
 Indeed, the changing Scottish government relations with local government are much more striking – see 
Cairney, 2011c. 
5
 There is particular disagreement about the extent to which the Scotland Office helped or hindered a deal 
with the Ministry of Justice over the Somerville case (see Trench 2009b: 86) and the issue of Forth bridge 
funding. 
6
 Full details of the commission can be found here http://www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk/  
